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DING-DONG DITCHED: CULTURES CLASH AS A TOWN
ATTEMPTS TO STOP REAL ESTATE SOLICITATIONS
Kevin Gilmore*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2015, James Jackson, a Toms River resident, was working
outside his home.1 A stranger wearing an all-black suit approached Jackson
with a proposition.2 The man wanted to buy Jackson’s house even though
the house was not on the market.3 After Jackson refused the offer, the
conversation, as Jackson claims, became “darker.”4 The man persisted and
mentioned that Jackson’s neighbors had already sold their homes to him,
and, in turn, he was going to sell them to Orthodox Jewish families.5 The
man prodded Jackson by asking why Jackson would want to live in an
Orthodox neighborhood.6 Jackson described the man’s tactics as “mind
games.”7
The encounter described by Jackson in the New York Post is not unique
to him, as other Toms River residents have experienced similar encounters.8
The recent increase in unsolicited offers can be traced to the neighboring
town of Lakewood, New Jersey, which houses the second largest Orthodox

* J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., University of Delaware. Born and raised
in Toms River, New Jersey. I would like to thank Professor Sarah Waldeck for all her advice
and guidance during the writing and editing process of this Comment, and my parents for all
their love and support.
1
Associated Press, Towns Restrict Door-to-Door Solicitation amid Hasidic Influx, N.Y.
POST (Feb. 23, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://nypost.com/2016/02/23/towns-restrict-door-to-doorsolicitation-amid-hasidic-influx/.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Associated Press, supra note 1.
8
See PAUL J. SHIVES & KENNETH B. FITZSIMMONS, REPORT ON REAL ESTATE
CANVASSING ACTIVITIES IN THE TOWNSHIP OF TOMS RIVER 4–9 (Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter
TOMS RIVER REPORT] ; see also David O’Reilly, Doorbells Ring, Charges Fly at Shore Towns,
INQUIRER DAILY NEWS (May 1, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly
/news/new_jersey/20160501_Doorbells_ring__charges_fly_at_Shore_towns.html.
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Jewish population in the United States.9 The Orthodox population is looking
towards expanding in Toms River because Lakewood is running out of
space, prices are increasing, and the Orthodox population continues to
grow.10
As more and more residents were subjected to real estate solicitations,
angst in Toms River grew to a boiling point.11 On February 23, 2016, the
Toms River Township Council yielded to residents’ complaints and banned
real estate solicitation in the most affected areas, those that border
Lakewood.12 The town argues it is protecting residents’ privacy and
protecting its neighborhoods from attempted blockbusting.13 The Orthodox
population argues Toms River is resisting change and trying to keep the
Orthodox population out.14
This Comment will analyze the cease and desist ordinance and address
the legal challenges that may be brought against it. Part II will explore
Lakewood’s history and the growth of the Orthodox population. Part III will
examine why Toms River residents fear a changing neighborhood. Part IV
will provide an overview of the Toms River ordinance. Part V will discuss
blockbusting and the township’s ability to combat the practice. Part VI will
analyze potential First Amendment challenges to the ordinance and their
likelihood of success. Part VII concludes.
II. LAKEWOOD AND THE GROWTH OF THE ORTHODOX JEWISH
POPULATION
Originally called “Bricksburg,” Lakewood, New Jersey, was first
settled in the early 1800s on a plot of land that was no more than dense
forest.15 The settlement grew, and Lakewood was incorporated in 1893.16

9

O’Reilly, supra note 8.
Id.; Associated Press, supra note 1; Shannon Mullen, Is Lakewood Growth Slowing
Down?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 18, 2016, 10:02 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/lo
cal/communitychange/2016/04/14/lakewood-growth-slowing-down/82713230/.
11
Alex Napoliello, Toms River Bans Real Estate Solicitation amid Orthodox Jewish
Boom, NJ.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 2:21 PM), http://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2016
/02/toms_river_bans_real_estate_solicitation_in_2_area.html.
12
TOMS RIVER, N.J., MUN. CODE § 391-55(D) (2016), https://ecode360.com/30747352.
See Napoliello, supra note 11.
13
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
14
See Shannon Mullen & Jean Mikle, Culture Shock Over Orthodox Expansion: Surging
Home Sales in Toms River and Jackson Are a Windfall for Some, a Source of Anxiety for
Others, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/comm
unitychange/2016/03/18/orthodox-home-sales-jackson-toms-river/81091688/;
see
also
Napoliello, supra note 11.
15
Charles Mandell, History of Lakewood, http://www.lakewoodnj.gov/history.php (last
visited Nov. 1, 2017).
16
Id.
10
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Lakewood became a resort town and retreat for millionaires and other
influential people, such as the Vanderbilts, Rockefellers, Runyard Kipling,
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and President Grover
Cleveland.17
The biggest turning point in Lakewood’s history came in 1943 when
Rabbi Aaron Kotler opened a yeshiva, Beth Medrash Govoha.18 A yeshiva
is a Jewish school for religious instruction.19 At its opening, the yeshiva
accommodated thirteen students.20 Now, Beth Medrash Govoha educates
more than 6,500 students and is one of the largest yeshivas in the world.21
As Beth Medrash Govoha grew, so did Lakewood’s Orthodox Jewish
population.22 According to the 1990 United States Census, Lakewood had a
population of 45,000 residents.23 In 2000, its population grew to 60,000
residents.24 In 2010, Lakewood’s population grew to approximately 93,000
residents, a fifty-four percent increase in population.25 This 32,000 increase
in residents, between 2000 and 2010, earned Lakewood the distinction of
being the fastest growing township in New Jersey.26 Since 2010,
Lakewood’s exponential growth has persisted. Presently, township officials
estimate the town population to be approximately 120,000.27 Thus, in six
years, Lakewood’s population has increased by 27,000 residents, or by thirty
percent.28 With 4,000 births per year,29 Lakewood’s population is expected

17

Id.
Id.
19
Yeshiva Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio
nary/yeshiva (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
20
Jeanette Rundquist, Lakewood, N.J.’s Fastest-Growing Town, Is Defined by its
Diversity, STAR-LEDGER (Feb. 6, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/
02/lakewood_is_njs_fastest-growin.html.
21
Shannon Mullen, Boom Town: Growth and Conflict in Lakewood, ASBURY PARK
PRESS (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/jackson-lakewood/2015/08/08/
lakewood-growth-boom-changing-ocean-county/31318143/; Mark Oppenheimer, The
Beggars of Lakewood, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 19, 2014, at MM40, https://www.nytimes
.com/2014/10/19/magazine/the-beggars-of-lakewood.html.
22
Rundquist, supra note 20.
23
U.S. Census Bureau, New Jersey Resident Population by Municipality: 1930–1990
(1990), http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/1990/poptrd6.htm.
24
U.S. Census Bureau, Urban and Rural Population: New Jersey, Counties and
Municipalities Census 2000 (2000), http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/2kcensus/sf1/u
r_pop.pdf.
25
U.S. Census Bureau, Total Population: 2000–2010 New Jersey Municipalities (2010),
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/census/2010/2010data/totPop.pdf
[hereinafter
2010
Census].
26
Id.
27
Associated Press, supra note 1.
28
See id.; see also O’Reilly, supra note 8.
29
See Mullen, supra note 21.
18
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to continue to grow and double to 220,000 residents by the year 2030.30 For
reference, New Jersey’s two biggest municipalities, Newark and Jersey City,
have populations of 277,000 and 247,000, respectively.31
Orthodox Jews constitute about sixty percent of Lakewood’s current
population, which ranks as the second highest Orthodox Jewish population
in the country behind Brooklyn, New York.32 Much of Lakewood’s growth
is attributed to Brooklyn Orthodox Jews relocating for a quieter, more
affordable area with a strong traditional Jewish community already in
place.33 The twenty-five-square-mile township boasts more than eighty
synagogues and one hundred religious schools and yeshivas.34 Through the
first quarter of 2016, the Lakewood Planning Board approved four
synagogues and three schools, in addition to thirty-eight residential units.35
Where there is a finite amount of space, an increase in population
creates a decrease in available space. With the continued influx of Orthodox
Jews and the growth of families, Lakewood is running out of space to
accommodate its new residents.36 Furthermore, the Lakewood real estate
demand continues to rise, in part, because Orthodox Jews do not drive on the
Sabbath; therefore, housing near Lakewood’s synagogues is priced at a
premium.37 Consequently, Orthodox Jews wanting to live in the area have
turned their sights to towns neighboring Lakewood, such as Toms River.38
As Orthodox Jews have turned their gaze outside of Lakewood, towns
neighboring Lakewood have ratcheted up their zoning laws to make it harder
for yeshivas and synagogues to be opened.39 Yeshivas and synagogues are
linchpins to an Orthodox Jewish community because Orthodox Jews cannot
drive on Sabbath; therefore, they must live close enough to walk to their
yeshivas and synagogues.40 Thus, stunting yeshiva and synagogue
development makes it less likely that Orthodox Jews will move to a
particular area.41
The Toms River Township Council and its governing bodies have taken
30

Mullen, supra note 10.
2010 Census, supra note 25.
32
O’Reilly, supra note 8.
33
See Mullen & Mickle, supra note 14; see also Mullen, supra note 21.
34
See Mullen, supra note 21; see also O’Reilly, supra note 8; Mark Di Ionno, Lakewood
Busing Issues Expose Private School Rides on Public Dollars, STAR LEDGER (May 14, 2017),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/05/lakewood_busing_issues_expose_private
_school_rides.html.
35
Mullen, supra note 10.
36
See id.
37
See O’Reilly, supra note 8.
38
Napoliello, supra note 11.
39
Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.
40
Id.
41
See id.
31
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similar actions that have fueled speculation that the town is trying to keep
the Orthodox Jewish community at bay.42 For example, in 2014, a Lakewood
developer purchased empty acreage near the Lakewood border planning to
build a temple.43 At the time of the project’s proposal, the property’s zoning
allowed for churches and synagogues to be built.44 The Toms River Zoning
Board, however, subsequently rezoned the property for residential use, and
the town purchased the property from the developer.45
Additionally, in April 2016, the Toms River Township Council
approved an ordinance allocating money to purchase fifty-six acres of land
in the North Dover section of Toms River.46 While billed as the protection
of undeveloped land, others speculate that Toms River is attempting to
purchase the land, which falls within the area where the town banned real
estate solicitation, to remove the possibility of Orthodox Jewish developers
acquiring the land.47 A Lakewood developer had previously proposed to
build townhomes and retail space on the property.48
Finally, in September 2016, the Toms River Township Council
approved the purchase of an eight-acre horse farm for $900,000.49 Again,
the land is located in the North Dover area and falls within a cease and desist
zone.50 The Township Council commented on the importance of preserving
land in North Dover because of its rapid development.51 Further, in October
2016, the Toms River Planning Board rejected the subdivision of a threeacre North Dover property into three lots, which would allow two additional
homes to be built on the property.52 The property fell within one of the cease
and desist zones.53 The board reasoned the subdivision would have a
42

Jean Mikle, Toms River Planners Reject Small Subdivision, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Oct.
6, 2016, 4:53 P.M.), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/redevelopment/2016/10/06/tomsriver-planners-reject-small-subdivision/91619010/; see Jean Mikle, Is $10M Land Buy a Plan
to Stop Lakewood?, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 15, 2016, 7:58 AM), http://www.app.com/s
tory/news/local/redevelopment/2016/04/12/toms-river-spend-103-million-north-dover-land/
82946422/; see also Jean Mikle, Toms River Approves Horse Farm Purchase, ASBURY PARK
PRESS (Oct. 12, 2016 4:43 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/redevelopment/2016/
10/12/toms-river-approves-horse-farm-purchase/91924484/.
43
See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14; see also Mikle, Is $10M Land Buy a Plan to Stop
Lakewood?, supra note 42.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Mikle, Is $10M Land Buy a Plan to Stop Lakewood?, supra note 42.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Mikle, Toms River Approves Horse Farm Purchase, supra note 42.
50
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at Appendix A; Google Maps, maps.google.com
(search “1270 Cox Cro Road, Toms River, NJ 08755”).
51
Id.
52
Mikle, Toms River Planners Reject Small Subdivision, supra note 42.
53
Id.
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negative impact on the area.54
These past actions will shape how Orthodox Jews view the current
Toms River ordinance, as some in the Orthodox community question the true
purpose of the ordinance.55 There is a feeling that real estate agents are being
used as scapegoats in another attempt to keep the Orthodox Jewish
community at bay.56 Still, Toms River residents claim to be subjected to
intense and intimidating solicitations regarding the sale of their homes.57
Moreover, the residents’ public outcry likely is not simply attributable to
annoyance or inconvenience; it is probably also rooted in fear.58 Naturally,
this requires an exploration into why Toms River residents would fear the
presence of an incoming Orthodox Jewish neighbor.
III. THE RESIDENTS’ PERSPECTIVE
In North Dover, front lawns are littered with signs that say “Don’t Sell!
Toms River Strong.”59 North Dover is at the center of the current
controversy because it is the Toms River neighborhood bordering
Lakewood.60 Real estate brokers representing Orthodox Jewish clients have
been soliciting North Dover homeowners to purchase their homes.61
Generally, the homes solicited were not on the market for sale.62 While some
homeowners have happily agreed, or at least acquiesced, to the sale of their
homes, others have complained about the tactics used by some of the real
estate brokers.63 Specifically, North Dover homeowners have accused the
brokers of intense and intimidating direct solicitations.64 Agents have gone
as far as telling homeowners their plan to turn the homeowners’
neighborhood into an Orthodox neighborhood.65
“Orthodox neighborhood” describes the dynamic of the neighborhood.
Orthodox communities are especially tight-knit where community members
take care of one another; however, secular neighbors usually are not included
54

Id.
Napoliello, supra note 11.
56
Id. See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14; see also Mullen, supra note 21.
57
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
58
See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.
59
See Napoliello, supra note 11.
60
See TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
61
Napoliello, supra note 11; see TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also
Associated Press, supra note 1.
62
Napoliello, supra note 11; see TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also
Associated Press, supra note 1.
63
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
64
Id.
65
See id. at 12.
55
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in this sense of community.66 This is because, like the Amish, Orthodox
Jewish communities are traditionally isolationist or separatist.67 Generally,
Orthodox Jews “attempt to create a bubble around their community.”68 This
makes it critical for Orthodox Jews to live close to one another.69
While signs that say “Don’t Sell! Toms River Strong” can be
interpreted as an indignant command,70 the more nuanced interpretation sees
the signs as a plea rather than a command— “Please, don’t sell because I am
not ready to sell.” To Toms River residents, when the first Orthodox Jewish
person purchases a home in the neighborhood, it signals that more Orthodox
families will populate the neighborhood and the dynamic of their
neighborhood, demographically and socially, is facing inevitable change.71
While non-Orthodox residents may live within an Orthodox neighborhood,
dramatic cultural differences, such as insularity, make it less attractive for
current non-Orthodox homeowners to remain, or prospective non-Orthodox
buyers to purchase homes in the neighborhood.72 Consequently, in the
remaining homeowners’ minds, it is better to sell early because Orthodox
Jews are willing to pay more to penetrate the neighborhood real estate
market; thus, with the only willing buyers being Orthodox Jews,
homeowners who remain may be at the mercy of whatever the Orthodox
Jews are willing to pay—whether it be above, equal to, or below market
value.73 But there is no certainty that future home values will even be
affected— whether it be positively or negatively. Therefore, the discussion
must be broadened beyond home values.
Toms River residents are hesitant of their new neighbors because Toms
River residents have witnessed first-hand the issues faced by the growing
neighboring town of Lakewood. With most Toms River residents utilizing
66

This American Life: A Not-So-Simple Majority, CHI. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 12, 2014)
(downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter This American Life]; Mark Oppenheimer,
Beggarville, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/
magazine/the-beggars-of-lakewood.html?_r=0; Benjamin Wallace-Wells; Them and Them,
N.Y. MAG., (Apr. 21, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/east-ramapo-hasidim-2013-4/;
see Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.
67
See AARON J. HAHN TAPPER, JUDAISMS: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INTRODUCTION TO
JEWS AND JEWISH IDENTITIES 117 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2016); see also This American Life: A
Not-So-Simple Majority, CHI. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 12, 2014) (downloaded using iTunes).
68
HAHN TAPPER, supra note 67, at 117.
69
See id.
70
As a command, the sign may be interpreted as “Hey! Don’t sell your home because I
don’t want to live next to an Orthodox Jew!” This opens the door for criticism that Toms
River residents simply do not want to live in a neighborhood with Orthodox Jews for antiSemitic reasons. Obviously, if the command is based on anti-Semitism, then it cannot be
tolerated.
71
See Mullen, supra note 21; see also Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.
72
See Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.
73
See id.
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public schools to educate their kids, particularly disconcerting to Toms River
residents is the decline of Lakewood’s public school system. In the minds
of those in the non-Orthodox community, the decline is attributed to the
growth of the Orthodox Jewish population and a shrinking tax base due to
the increase of tax-exempt properties.
First, property taxes are a point of contention. There is a widely-held
belief among Toms River residents, and non-Orthodox Lakewood residents,
that the Orthodox Jewish community fails to pay its fair share of property
taxes because its synagogues, yeshivas, and other religious properties
operate as tax-exempt properties.74 In 2015, the Lakewood Township Tax
Assessor debunked the rumor that the Orthodox Jewish community was
responsible for “thousands” of tax exempt properties in Lakewood; instead,
the number of tax exempt properties attributable to the Orthodox Jewish
community was in the hundreds, approximately 350 properties in total.75
But approximately eight percent of Lakewood’s total assessed value is
tax-exempt properties owned by private schools, charities, and religious
institutions.76 Lakewood has the highest percentage in Ocean County.77 In
total, these tax-exempt institutions account for $597 million in accessed
value, and $5.1 million local tax revenue lost.78 Furthermore, the amount of
these tax-exempt institutions has increased over time, having grown from
only five percent in 2009.79 In comparison, only one and one-half percent of
Toms River properties are tax-exempt private schools, charities, and
religious institutions.80 Therefore, it is likely Toms River residents are
concerned that an increase in the Toms River Orthodox Jewish population
will increase the number of tax-exempt properties, thereby increasing the tax
burden on current residents.
Property taxes are closely linked to public schools because property
taxes are what fund public schools.81 The Toms River School District is
comprised of eighteen total schools: twelve elementary schools, three

74
See Shannon Mullen, Lakewood: 350 Orthodox Properties Tax-Exempt, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/jackson-lakewood/lakewo
od/2015/10/09/tax-exempt-orthodox-property/73641878/.
75
Id.
76
Id. In Lakewood, these tax-free properties include: 181 private schools, 77
synagogues, 23 churches, 18 dormitories, 52 rabbi residences, and 14 properties that are both
rabbi residences and synagogues. Id.
77
Id. Further, Lakewood’s percentage of total tax-exempt properties, which include
public schools and government-owned property, is seventeen percent— the highest in the
county. Id.
78
Mullen, supra note 74.
79
Id.
80
Mullen, supra note 74.
81
This American Life, supra note 66.
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intermediate schools, and three high schools.82 In terms of enrollment, Toms
River educates 15,934 students83 and is one of the largest school districts in
New Jersey.84 A majority of Toms River residents rely on the public school
system to educate their children.85 Adding another layer to the issue, the
school district has previously betrayed the trust of Toms River residents as
it was embroiled in one of the biggest New Jersey corruption cases in recent
history.86 Therefore, Toms River residents are extremely cognizant of the
public school situation in Lakewood, thus, creating a fear among residents
that an increased Orthodox population in Toms River will diminish the
quality and quantity of public schools on which they rely.
In Lakewood, roughly 30,000 students attend private schools, which
are tuition-based yeshivas.87 Comparatively, only about 5,900 students
attend public school, most of which are minorities coming from low-income
families.88 As is representative of the population, Orthodox Jews make up a
82

TOMS RIVER REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY FOR THE TOMS RIVER
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 4, 16 (2016), http://www.trschools.com/docs/20162209_083511
_8.pdf.
83
New Jersey Department of Education, 2016–2017 Enrollment District Reported Data,
http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/education/data/enr11plus.pl
84
See id. See also New Jersey Department of Education, 2016–2017 Enrollment District
Reported Data, http://www.state.nj.us/education/data/enr/enr17/county.htm. Toms River is
the fifth largest school district based on student population. Id. Only Newark, Jersey City,
Paterson and Elizabeth have larger student populations. Id.
85
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2010, PROFILE OF GENERAL POPULATION AND
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS (2010), http://www.planning.co.ocean.nj.us/census/2010/MCD_
profiles/2010_DP-1_Toms_river.pdf. In 2010, there were approximately 20,000 residents
that were nineteen years old or younger. Id. In 2017, 15,934 students attended public schools.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, supra note 83. By comparing this data, an
inference can be made that Toms River residents rely heavily on public schools to educate
their children as opposed to private schools.
86
Matt Friedman, Former Toms River Superintendent Is Sentenced to 11 Years for
Bribery, Tax Evasion, NJ.COM (Sept. 15, 2012 2:11, PM), http://www.nj.com/ocean/
index.ssf/2012/09/former_toms_river_superintendent_is_sentenced_to_11_years_for_briber
y_tax_evasion.html. In 2010, Toms River Regional School District Superintendent, Michael
Ritacco, was arrested for taking between $1 to $2 million in bribes and kickbacks for setting
up inflated insurance contracts, which resulted in the district paying $500,000 to $600,000
annually in excess fees. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Former
Superintendent of Toms River Regional School District Pleads Guilty to Corruption and Tax
Fraud Charges (Apr. 5, 2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newark/pressreleases/2012/former-superintendent-of-toms-river-regional-school-district-pleads-guilty-tocorruption-and-tax-fraud-charges. Ritacco pleaded guilty to charges of mail fraud and
conspiracy to defraud the IRS. Id. In September 2012, Ritacco was sentenced to eleven years
and three months in prison. Friedman, supra note 86.
87
Di Ionno, supra note 34.
88
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, LAKEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT
ENROLLMENT DATA (2017), http://www.state.nj.us/education/ (select “Data”; then
“Enrollment”; then “2016-2017”; then “District”; scroll down and select “Ocean”; and finally
select “Lakewood Township”). Further illustrating the financial situation of public school
families, 4,087.5 of 5,853.5 public school students qualify for the Free Lunch program. Id.
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majority of Lakewood’s Board of Education.89 This creates an interesting
dynamic because Orthodox Jewish children do not attend Lakewood’s public
schools.90 Such a dynamic creates tension between public school families
and Orthodox Jews sitting on the Board. With a multi-million dollar
Lakewood School District budget deficit,91 tensions run high between public
school parents and the Lakewood Board of Education because budget cuts
have left the public schools under-resourced and overcrowded.92
Recently, student busing has caused frustration because transportation
costs have largely been responsible for the budget deficit.93 In New Jersey,
there are two types of busing: mandatory and courtesy.94 The State requires
mandatory busing for students living more than two miles away from their
school, whether the school is public or private.95 Thus, by law, Lakewood
School District is required to bus about 21,000 of the 30,000 private school
students because these students live more than two miles from their
schools.96
Courtesy busing may be provided by the district to students living less
than two miles from their school, public or private; however, the school
district is solely responsible for footing the bill of courtesy busing.97 While
about 7,000 private school students use courtesy busing,98 about 3,000 of the

This equates to 69.8% of students attending Lakewood public schools.
89
See Mullen, supra note 21; see also Meir Rinde, Is Lakewood on the Verge of a
Meltdown?, NJSPOTLIGHT (June 21, 2016), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/16/06/20/islakewood-on-the-verge-of-a-meltdown/.
90
See Di Ionno, supra note 34.
91
Rob Spahr, Christie Signs Bill to Fund Busing for Lakewood’s Private Schools,
NJ.COM (Aug. 9, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2016/08/christie_signs
_bill_to_publicly_fund_busing_for_la.html.
92
Rob Spahr, NJ School District in Crisis: 5 Things to Know, NJ.COM (Feb. 12, 2016
6:58 PM), http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2016/02/nj_school_district_in_crisis_5_things
_to_know.html. See Rinde, supra note 89. In 2014, the New Jersey Department of Education
appointed a fiscal monitor to oversee the Lakewood School District’s finances and fix its
budget. Nicholas Huba, State Sends Fiscal Monitor to Lakewood, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr.
26, 2014), http://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/taxes/2014/04/25/statesend-fiscal-monitor-to-lakewood-school-district/8162327/.
93
Spahr, supra note 91.
94
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6A:27-1.4(a), 1.5(a) (2017).
95
§ 6A:27-1.4(a)(1). For high school students, the distance is increased to two and onehalf miles. Id.
96
Payton Guion, Lakewood Busing: Oversight Committee Knows Little About
Consortium, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:53 AM), http://www.app.com/story/
news/local/communitychange/2017/01/17/lakewood-busing-oversight-committee-knowslittle-consortium/96241244/.
97
§ 6A:27-1.5(a).
98
Shannon Mullen, NJ Senate Oks Aid for Lakewood Private School Busing, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (June 24, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/2016/06/
23/senate-busing-singer-lakewood-schools/86308310/.
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nearly 6,000 public school students rely on courtesy busing to get to school.99
In total, Lakewood’s transportation costs for both mandatory and courtesy
busing reached $23.9 million for the 2015–2016 school year.100
In early 2016, confronting a twelve-million-dollar budget deficit for the
2016–2017 school year, the Lakewood Board of Education was set to
eliminate seventeen staff positions, including ten teaching positions, some
middle-school activities, and courtesy busing.101 Such cuts have increased
tensions between public school families and the Board as public school
families felt disproportionately affected.102
For instance, the proposed elimination of courtesy busing would have
affected public school students far more than private school students. While
a greater number of private school students (7,000) rely on courtesy busing,
only about one-fourth, or twenty-five percent, of private school children
would have been affected.103 Further, it has been argued that because of the
tight-knit nature of the Orthodox community, the private school parents were
better equipped to deal with the elimination of courtesy busing through
community coordinated car pools.104
Alternatively, while the overall number of public school students
(3,000) affected by cuts to courtesy busing is less than private school
students, the proportional number of public school students is far greater than
private school students because roughly one-half, or fifty percent, of public
school students rely on courtesy busing to get to school.105 The nonOrthodox community, made up of mostly African American and Latino
families, lack the support system seen in the Orthodox community.106
Therefore, with the elimination of courtesy busing, many public school
students are without an alternative means to get to school because their
99

Id.
Spahr, supra note 91.
101
Shannon Mullen, Lakewood Monitor Imposes Teacher, Busing Cuts, ASBURY PARK
PRESS (May 12, 2016, 5:58 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/in-ourschools/2016/05/12/lakewood-monitor-imposes-teacher-busing-cuts/84282406/.
102
Shannon Mullen, Lakewood Budget Plan Cuts 68 Teachers, Courtesy Busing, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Mar. 22, 2016, 11:43 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/2016/03
/21/lakewood-budget-cuts-teachers-busing/82090816/; Shannon Mullen, Lakewood School
Board Votes to Save Courtesy Busing, Override Still Possible, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Feb. 18,
2016,
12:54
PM),
http://www.app.com/story/news/local/communitychange/2016/
02/17/lakewood-courtesy-busing-township-surplus/80449846/; Spahr, supra note 92; see
Mullen, supra note 101; see also Rinde, supra note 89.
103
Rinde, supra note 89; see Shannon Mullen, New Lakewood Bus Program is $1M Short,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Sept. 2, 2016, 8:05 PM), http://www.app.com/story/news/education/inour-schools/2016/09/01/lakewood-busing-private-consortium/89654944/; see also Spahr,
supra note 92.
104
Rinde, supra note 89.
105
See Spahr, supra note 91.
106
See Mullen, supra note 21; see also Rinde, supra note 89.
100
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parents do not know how to drive, or their parents cannot afford to own a
car.107 This is just one example of why tensions have grown between public
school parents and the Orthodox community.
Lakewood school officials argue the blame belongs to the State because
the funding formula accounts only for public school students, but disregards
private school students, leading to the State underfunding of the school
district.108 In August 2016, New Jersey enacted legislation to help rectify
the busing situation.109
While Orthodox Jewish residents lack the clout in Toms River to affect
the school budget, the current situation in Lakewood cannot be comforting
to Toms River residents, especially since the situation in Lakewood is not an
anomaly. In East Ramapo, New York, the public-school parents have
accused the mostly Orthodox-led board of cutting public school budgets,
negatively impacting their children, and favoring private religious schools.110
The East Ramapo School District has gone as far as closing two public
schools, which, in turn, were sold to private Orthodox yeshivas.111
Again, the issues facing Lakewood and East Ramapo are not likely to
affect Toms River in the immediate future. Toms River residents, however,
are beginning to experience the effects an increased Orthodox Jewish
population has on the school district, such as increased private busing
costs.112 Further, with property values generally tied to public schools,113 it
stands to reason that an increase of the Toms River Orthodox Jewish
population is nerve-racking to Toms River homeowners.
Beside annoyance, the fears described above drive the public outcry
107

See Rinde, supra note 89.
Spahr, supra note 92.
109
Id. The State will provide the Lakewood School District $7.2 million over three years,
or $2.4 million a year, for the purposes of transporting students to private schools. Spahr,
supra note 91. The Lakewood Busing consortium was formed for the 2016–2017 school year
and will be responsible for busing private school students at a cost of $16 million per year—
$2.4 million funded by the state, and the remaining $14.4 million funded by local taxpayers.
Payton Guion, Lakewood Busing: Oversight Committee Knows Little About Consortium,
ASBURY PARK PRESS (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:53 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/local
/communitychange/2017/01/17/lakewood-busing-oversight-committee-knows-littleconsortium/96241244/.
110
This American Life, supra note 66.
111
Id.
112
Mike Davis, The Next Lakewood? Jackson, Other Districts Face Booming Private Bus
Costs, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Apr. 28, 2017, 7:07 AM), http://www.app.com/story/news/inve
stigations/watchdog/education/2017/04/27/nj-aid-in-lieu-of-school-transportation-nonpublic
-lakewood/100616474/.
113
Michele Lerner, School Quality Has a Mighty Influence on Neighborhood Choice,
Home Values, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/sch
ool-quality-has-a-mighty-influence-on-neighborhood-choice-home-values/2015/09/03/826
c289a-46ad-11e5-8ab4-c73967a143d3_story.html?utm_term=.6ab1530a7ded.
108
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when confronting the intense real estate solicitations Toms River residents
have experienced. After receiving a substantial amount of complaints, Toms
River took action and passed an ordinance addressing real estate solicitation,
specifically targeting the North Dover area.114
IV. THE TOMS RIVER ORDINANCE
In 2004, Toms River passed its original “no-knock” ordinance that
banned door-to-door canvassing and solicitation.115 Toms River passed this
ordinance in the interest of public safety after the murder of a Toms River
resident by a solicitor from out of town.116 The ordinance created a registry
in which residents could enroll if they did not want to be subjected to doorto-door solicitations.117 Additionally, solicitors were required to obtain a
license from the Toms River Clerk’s office.118 Solicitors who violated this
ordinance by soliciting residents on the registry were subject to fines, up to
$1,250,119 and penalties, such as revocation of their solicitor’s license and/or
ineligibility to apply for a new license.120 Interestingly, the original “noknock” ordinance did not specifically mention real estate solicitations.121
The second iteration of the “no-knock” ordinance was passed in
2015.122 After many residents complained of real estate brokers soliciting
door-to-door, using “intrusive, intimidating, and questionable tactics,”123
Toms River adopted an ordinance to specifically outlaw real estate
solicitations.124 The ordinance achieved three results. First, the ordinance
made real estate solicitation subject to Toms River’s general soliciting
ordinances, requiring real estate solicitors to obtain solicitation permits.125
Second, the ordinance explicitly prohibited blockbusting.126 Third, the
ordinance expanded the “no-knock” registry to apply to real estate

114
TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-55(A)–(D) (2017); see
Napoliello, supra note 11.
115
See id. § 391-36.1.
116
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2; Phil Stilton, How a Grisly Murder Shaped
Toms River’s No-Knock Ordinance, SHORENEWSNETWORK.COM (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www
.shorenewsnetwork.com/2015/10/how-a-grisly-murder-shaped-toms-rivers-no-knock-ordina
nce/.
117
§ 391-36.1.
118
Id. § 391-31.
119
Id. § 391-36.1(D)(1).
120
Id. § 391-36.1(D)(2)–(3).
121
See id. § 391-36.1.
122
§§ 391-48–52.
123
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
124
§§ 391-48–52.
125
Id. § 391-49.
126
Id. § 391-51. For a thorough discussion of blockbusting, see infra Part VI.
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solicitations and canvasing.127

Despite the Town’s revisions to the “no-knock” ordinance, residents
were still subject to unwanted real estate solicitations by permitted and
unpermitted solicitors.128 Further, the “no-knock” ordinance did not
discourage solicitors from engaging residents on their front lawns or in the
streets.129 Yet again, Toms River revised its “no-knock ordinance.”130 In
November 2015, the town adopted an ordinance authorizing the Township
Council to ban real estate solicitations in certain areas of the town that were
subject to excessive and unwarranted solicitations.131
This new ordinance required the town to fulfill certain procedural steps
to determine whether a solicitation ban was warranted.132 First, the Business
Administrator and Township Attorney must conduct an investigation and the
town must hold a public hearing to allow residents to express concerns over
incidents of real estate solicitation.133 Next, the Business Administrator and
Township Attorney must release a report that explains their findings,
recommends whether a solicitation ban should be adopted, and, if so,
specifies the geographic area the ban covers.134 After considering the report,
the Township Council may impose a real estate solicitation ban for certain
neighborhoods if it finds either of the following are present: (1) real property
owners are subject to “intense and repeated” real estate solicitations for the
sale of their homes; or (2) real property owners are subjected to
discriminatory practices under section 391-51, which includes
blockbusting.135
Once a cease and desist zone is established, real estate brokers are
prohibited from soliciting the sale of real estate within the zone’s boundaries
as set out in the ordinance.136 Additionally, these zones cannot prohibit
solicitation for more than five years.137 The cease and desist zone, however,
may be re-established through the same procedural requirements used to
create the zone in the first instance.138 Penalties for solicitation include fines
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. § 391-50.
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
Id.
§ 391-55(A)–(C).
Id.
Id. § 391-55(A).
Id. § 391-55(B).
Id. § 391-55(C)(1).
Id.
TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-55(C)(2)–(3) (2017).
Id. § 391-55(C)(5).
Id.
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of up to $1250 per offense and/or revocation of any permit issued under the
ordinance.139
On February 23, 2016, the Toms River Township Council passed an
ordinance creating two cease and desist zones, wherein all real estate
solicitation would be banned.140 The two zones encompass the North Dover
neighborhoods, which both border Lakewood.141 Toms River satisfied the
requirements necessary before establishing these cease and desist zones.142
After conducting an investigation and a public hearing,143 the Business
Administrator and Township Attorney released their report, which pointedly
stated “neighborhoods in the Township’s northwest quadrant have been
heavily and repeatedly targeted for real estate solicitations.”144 The report
further found incidents of illegal behavior, such as blockbusting.145 The
report recommended that cease and desist zones should be established
because the real estate solicitations were “ero[ding]” the residents’ quality
of life.146
V. BLOCKBUSTING
Blockbusting is defined as the “act or practice, [usually] by a real-estate
broker, of persuading one or more property owners to sell their property
quickly, and often at a loss, to avoid an imminent influx of minority
groups.”147 Blockbusting arose after the ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer, where
the United States Supreme Court struck down restrictive covenants which
prohibited the sale of a home to buyers of a particular race.148 Before Shelley,
property owners could enter into restrictive covenants that prevented
minorities from buying or renting property in a neighborhood.149 These
139
140
141

§ 391-53.
Id. § 391-55(D).
Id. See TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391 Attachment 1:1

(2017).
142

TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
The public hearing was held on January 21, 2016, in the Toms River Town Hall. Jean
Mikle, Toms River to Introduce Cease and Desist Ordinance, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Feb. 9,
2016 9:47 A.M.), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/toms-river-area/2016/02/08/toms-riv
er-introduce-cease-and-desist-ordinance/80024206/.
144
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
145
Id. (“The evidence further established credible incidents of blockbusting and other
suspicious behavior—in some cases tantamount to stalking or harassment—creating an
atmosphere in which residents feel under siege, unsafe, and unduly pressured to sell their
homes.”).
146
Id.
147
Blockbusting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
148
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
149
Id. at 4.
143
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covenants could be used by the homeowner to prevent sale to a minority, or
could be enforced by third-party homeowners in the neighborhood if a
homeowner tried selling or renting a home to a minority.150
After Shelley, blockbusting became a method of integrating segregated
neighborhoods by creating a means for black entry into white
neighborhoods.151 Blockbusting grew in popularity because realtors used it
as a way to generate profit.152 Usually, blockbusting occurred in white
neighborhoods bordering black ghettos.153 Using the climate of the time to
their advantage, real estate brokers incited fear into white homeowners by
claiming minorities were moving into their neighborhood.154 Many times,
brokers would offer cash for homes.155 By using these methods, real estate
brokers were able to purchase homes from white homeowners at a discount,
and then turn around and sell to black homebuyers for a profit.156
The practice continued unabated until Congress made blockbusting an
illegal practice under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.157 The Fair Housing Act
outlaws inducement of home sales, “for profit,” in anticipation of entry or
prospective entry of persons into the neighborhood based on certain
characteristics, such as race and religion.158 While not defined by the Fair
Housing Act, “for profit” has been interpreted to mean any form of financial
gain.159 In addition, district courts have found inducements need not be
explicit to constitute blockbusting, but that the acts and words should be
interpreted as a reasonable man would in the circumstances.160
At the state level, New Jersey followed the federal government’s lead
and outlawed blockbusting through its Law Against Discrimination Act
(LAD).161 New Jersey’s law is more comprehensive than the federal statute
and creates a broader umbrella under which actions may constitute
150

Id. at 6–7.
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 37–38 (1993).
152
Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1998).
153
Id. at 1151.
154
Id. at 1151–52.
155
Id. at 1151.
156
Id.
157
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012).
158
Id.
159
See, e.g., Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291, 294 (D. Md. 1974) (finding that a sale
of property where the agent was entitled to a real estate commission was “for profit” under
the Fair Housing Act); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1311–12 (D. Md. 1969)
(interpreting “for profit” to include entitlements to commissions for real estate sales).
160
Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1049 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d and remanded sub
nom. Zuch v. John H. Hussey Co., 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mitchell,
327 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
161
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(k) (2017).
151
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blockbusting.162 By analyzing the state statute, it becomes clear that three
requirements are necessary for words or actions to qualify as blockbusting.
First, an individual must attempt to induce a transaction from which they
may gain financially.163 This language seems much broader than the Fair
Housing Act’s requirement that the inducement must be made “for profit.”164
Second, there must be a representation that a change has, will, or may occur
in the composition of an area.165 The LAD enumerates a list of
characteristics for which representations may not be made, such as race,
creed, and color.166 Third, an additional representation must be made,
directly or indirectly, to suggest that these changes may lead to undesirable
consequences to the area.167 An undesirable consequence includes but is not
limited to, a decrease in property value, increase in crime or anti-social
behavior, or decrease in quality of schools.168 The statute does not require
the actual occurrence of any of these consequences, just a representation that
they may occur.169
Furthermore, the New Jersey Real Estate Commission has adopted
rules against blockbusting.170 The regulation prohibits the solicitation of
residential property based on an alleged change of value relating to the entry,
or prospective entry, of “another race, religion, or ethnic origin” into the
neighborhood.171 Unlike the Fair Housing Act or LAD, these rules apply
only to licensed real estate agents.172 Yet, like the LAD, a change in property
values need not actually occur, but only be represented.173 Additionally, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has held municipalities are allowed to pass antiblockbusting ordinances.174 In Summer v. Teaneck, the court reasoned that
municipalities were better situated than the State to uncover blockbusting
because blockbusting depends on the locality, varying in its “intensity and

162

See id.
Id.
164
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012) (“For profit”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(k)
(2017) (“may gain financially”).
165
§ 10:5-12(k).
166
Id. The statute includes the following characteristics: race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, familial status,
pregnancy, sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual orientation, disability,
nationality. Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-7.4(a) (2017).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
See Summer v. Twp. of Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 765–67 (N.J. 1969); see also
Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 236 A.2d 874, 880–82 (N.J. 1967).
163
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hurt.”175 Therefore, because municipalities were closer to the scene of the
blockbusting, municipalities are better equipped to craft a strategy to solve
their unique blockbusting problem.176 Additionally, the court believed the
“evils” of blockbusting were too cancerous to not allow the municipalities to
combat such acts.177 Thus, it is apparent from statutes and case law that
blockbusting is illegal,178 and that municipalities, such as Toms River, have
a right to pass ordinances generally prohibiting blockbusting.179
Nonetheless, the issue becomes whether the real estate brokers’ actions
amount to blockbusting.
To start, the geography of the current neighborhoods draws
comparisons of those subject to blockbusting in the 1950s. The Toms River
neighborhoods encountering the alleged blockbusting are those bordering
the Orthodox Jewish community in Lakewood;180 likewise, the 1950s
neighborhoods targeted for blockbusting bordered minority, often black,
neighborhoods.181 The situations contrast, however, when looking at the
reasoning inciting fear. In the 1950s and 1960s, real estate agents
predominately preyed on white homeowners’ real or assumed fears that
black neighbors would bring increased crime and decreased safety to their
neighborhood.182 This, in the homeowners’ minds, decreased property
values.183
To Toms River residents, an increase in crime is not fueling their fears
because Lakewood has seen a decrease in crime since the growth of the
Orthodox Jewish population.184 Instead, Toms River residents likely fear a

175

Summer, 251 A.2d at 764.
Id.
177
Id. In describing the pitfalls of blockbusting, the court explained:
The inducement is the supposed loss in property values for those who
remain. The evils are evident. Sellers are exploited, and hostility is
excited both in those who are persuaded their economic interests are
thus threatened and in the group of citizens who are given to understand
their presence is a blight.
Id. at 764.
178
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(k) (2017).
179
Summer, 251 A.2d at 765–67.
180
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
181
Massey & Denton, supra note 151, at 37–38.
182
Mehlhorn, supra note 152, at 1151–52.
183
Id.
184
Compare FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2016),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s (select “2016”; then “Crime in the U.S. 2016”; then
“Table 6”; then “New Jersey”) (169 violent crimes reported), with FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2000), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s
(select “2000”; then “Table 8 – Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by City 10,000 and
over, 2000”; then scroll down to “New Jersey”; and then “Lakewood”) (240 violent crimes
reported).
176
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decrease in property values because of an increase of anti-social behavior
and decline in schools serving the area.185 This can be gleaned from the
Toms River code addressing blockbusting.186 In the code, solicitations
cannot be made when making specific representations that incite fear or
panic to the homeowner.187 Classic elements of blockbusting are noted, such
as representations about decreasing property values, changes in the
demographic of the neighborhood, and increase in crime rates.188 As in the
LAD, however, additional representations cannot be made about “an
increase in . . . antisocial behavior in the area”189 or “a decline in the quality
of schools serving the area.”190 Those two additional representations
illustrate Toms River residents’ underlying fears regarding the influx of the
Orthodox Jewish community; the underlying fears are related.
As previously mentioned, residents have complained of intense,
intimidating, and unwanted solicitations for the sale of their homes.191 A
simple knock on the door from an unwanted real estate solicitor, however,
does not constitute blockbusting because the solicitor must invoke elements
of fear or panic in convincing the homeowner to sell his or her home.192
Certainly, some of the interactions between homeowners and real estate
agents fit this bill. For example, one homeowner was told “you wouldn’t
want to live here when [I am] done”,193 while another was told, “You really
should sell your house. I’m sure you don’t want to be surrounded by
Jews.”194 Similarly, another homeowner was told, “We’re ready to buy the
whole neighborhood[,]”195 and asked, “Why do you want to live with us?”,196
meaning Orthodox Jewish neighbors. Further, residents have described
frequent “drive-bys” where agents took pictures of their homes.197 These
comments and actions seem to invoke elements of blockbusting because
these real estate agents are trying to induce the sale of homes by the
threatened entry of the Orthodox Jewish population. But, as admitted in the
185

See TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-51(B)(3)–(4) (2017).
Id. § 391-51(B).
187
Id. § 391-51(G).
188
Id. § 391-51(B).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
192
See Mehlhorn, supra note 152, at 1151–52.
193
O’Reilly, supra note 8.
194
Shannon Mullen & Jean Mikle, Culture Shock Over Orthodox Expansion: Home Sales
in Toms River and Jackson Are a Windfall for Some, A Source of Anxiety for Others, ASBURY
PARK PRESS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/communitychange/2016/
03/18/orthodox-home-sales-jackson-toms-river/81091688/.
195
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 13; O’Reilly, supra note 8.
186
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Toms River Report, it is not evident that blockbusting is prevalent
throughout the area—meaning not all real estate agents soliciting home sales
are employing blockbusting tactics.198
In the 1950s and 1960s, real estate agents used fear tactics to induce
white homeowners to sell their homes at a below value price.199 While not
statutorily required to prove blockbusting, home sales below market value
can be an indication of the practice.200 In Toms River, reports have shown
that homes in the cease and desist zones are receiving higher purchase offers
and are being purchased above their assessed value.201 In some instances,
houses in neighborhoods bordering Lakewood have sold for $50,000 to
$250,000 above their accessed value.202 Yet, the inducement for a
homeowner to sell his or her home is the supposed loss of property value if
he or she remains.203 Therefore, it is possible that the economic effects of
blockbusting are not felt by the homeowners that sell first, but by those
clinging onto their old neighborhood and sell last. While homes are selling
well above their market value, real estate solicitation by the Orthodox Jewish
community is a relatively new issue facing Toms River, and the homes being
sold are usually one of the first few homes sold in the neighborhood.
It should be stated, however, that future housing prices are unknown.
It is uncertain whether property values will decrease for those remaining in
a transitionary neighborhood. For instance, as the Orthodox Jewish
population has increased, Lakewood’s property values have increased
because it has become a desirable location for Orthodox Jews to live.204
Therefore, it seems possible that property values in newly transitioned Toms
River neighborhoods will not decrease because the remaining non-Orthodox
houses will become desirable properties for Orthodox Jewish families.
Yet, blockbusting does not require an actual decrease in property
values; it only requires a representation, direct or indirect, that undesirable
consequences, including decreased property values, shall follow the entry of
a religious group (i.e. Orthodox Jews) into the neighborhood.205 Statements,
such as “[you] wouldn’t want to live here when [I’m] done”, made to Toms
River homeowners by real estate agents,206 seem to insinuate certain
198

TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
See Mehlhorn, supra note 152, at 1151–52.
200
See id.
201
Mullen & Mikle, supra note 14.
202
Id.
203
Summer v. Twp. of Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 762 (N.J. 1969).
204
Mullen, supra note 10; Rinde, supra note 89; Associated Press, supra note 1; see also
Mullen, supra note 21.
205
See N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-12(k) (2017); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012).
206
O’Reilly, supra note 8.
199
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undesirable consequences facing the homeowner’s neighborhood and are
clearly made as an inducement to sell. These statements implicate the very
evils blockbusting statutes try to prevent: the incitement of hostility between
those who believe their economic interest is threatened and the incoming
population who “understand [its] presence [to be] a blight.”207
Therefore, it is a town’s responsibility to end potential blockbusting
practices in their infancy before they become a wide spread issue and their
cancerous effect infects the town and its residents. Consequently, it does not
make sense for Toms River to have to wait for the practice to become
prevalent to take action against it because, at that point, it will become too
late to rectify. The Toms River ordinance seems to accomplish the goal of
preventing blockbusting in the cease and desist zones; however, the cease
and desist zones also prevent non-blockbusting solicitors from soliciting
homeowners for the sale of their homes in those zones.208 Thus, the next
question to address is whether the cease and desist zone would withstand
constitutional challenges by law-abiding solicitors.
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE TOMS RIVER ORDINANCE
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”209 The
Supreme Court of the United States has divided speech into two different
categories: (1) commercial speech, and (2) non-commercial speech.210 In
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, the Court defined commercial speech as
speech that puts forth a commercial transaction,211 and in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission, the Court also defined
commercial speech as speech for the speaker’s economic benefit.212 Until
1975, the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.213 Then, in
Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment’s
protection to commercial speech, protecting it from government
regulation.214 These First Amendment protections are applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.215 The Court has refused to allow the
207

Summer, 251 A.2d at 762. See N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834,
836 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating the evils of blockbusting include the “fanning of racial tensions
and promoting of ethnic stereotypes”).
208
TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS RIVER § 391-55(c)(3) (2016),
http://ecode360.com/30316219
209
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
210
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
211
Id. at 66.
212
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
213
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65.
214
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63.
215
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
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government to adopt a “highly paternalistic” role over commercial speech.216
While commercial speech is protected, the Court makes a
“commonsense” distinction between commercial and non-commercial
speech.217 In Central Hudson, the Court ruled that commercial speech is not
afforded full First Amendment protection under the Constitution, but a lesser
protection than other forms of speech or expression, such as non-commercial
speech.218 To determine whether commercial speech is constitutionally
protected, the Court considers two factors: (1) the nature of the speech or
expression, and (2) the government’s interest in regulating the speech or
expression.219
The First Amendment governs commercial speech because advertising
serves an informational function to consumers.220 The Court ruled that the
Constitution will not protect commercial speech “more likely to deceive the
public than inform it,221 or commercial speech pertaining to illegal
activity.222 But, where the speech is not misleading or does not perpetuate
illegal activity, the government’s power in regulating commercial speech is
limited by Central Hudson.223 Therefore, to regulate commercial speech, the
government must satisfy the Central Hudson framework.224 Further, the
state must articulate a substantial interest achieved through the restriction of
the commercial speech.225 Finally, the restriction on commercial speech
must be in proportion to the state’s interest.226 In measuring adherence to
the proportionality requirement, courts look to two factors.227 First, the
state’s interest must be “directly advance[d]” by the restriction on
commercial speech.228 This means “ineffective or remote support” of the
state’s interest is insufficient to justify a restriction on commercial speech.229

Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976)).
216
Id. at 562 (rejecting the view that the government has “complete power to suppress or
regulate commercial speech” and reasoning that people recognize their own best interests by
being informed and, therefore, opening the channels of communication is the best way to
achieve that end).
217
Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
218
Id. at 562–63.
219
Id. at 563.
220
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
221
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
222
Id. at 564; Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973).
223
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
224
Id. at 563–66.
225
Id. at 564.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 564–65.
228
Id. at 564.
229
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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Second, the restriction cannot be over-inclusive.230 A restriction will be
struck down if a more limited restriction would have advanced the state’s
interest in the same manner.231
The Central Hudson framework creates a four-part analysis to
determine whether certain commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protection.232 The Court considers whether: (1) the speech concerns
unlawful activity or is misleading; (2) the state has a substantial interest; (3)
the restriction is directly related to the state’s interest; and (4) the restriction
is not broader than necessary.233
The Second Circuit has applied the Central Hudson framework when
interpreting the constitutionality of solicitation bans in certain
communities.234 In drafting its ordinance, Toms River relied upon a New
York law allowing the creation of cease and desist zones to stop real estate
solicitation235 and Second Circuit opinions interpreting the law.236 Under
New York law, the Secretary of State may combat intense and repeated
solicitations by issuing a non-solicitation order for certain areas237 or by
creating cease and desist zones, which ban solicitation where residential
homeowners submit statements expressing their request to not be solicited
by real estate brokers.238 It is important to note the difference between the
two types of solicitation restrictions. A non-solicitation order creates a
blanket ban over an area for real estate solicitation, meaning no property
falling within the area covered by the order can be solicited by a real estate
agent.239 In contrast, a cease and desist zone allows residents in that area to
opt into the real estate solicitation ban, and real estate agents may not solicit
residents who have opted into the cease and desist zone.240 Real estate
agents, however, may still solicit residents that have not filed a statement
with the secretary expressing their intent to participate in the cease and desist
zone.241

230

Id.
Id.
232
Id. at 566.
233
Id.
234
See Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2002); see also N.Y. State Ass’n of
Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 1994).
235
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-(h)(2)–(3) (2002).
236
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 456.
237
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-h(2) (2002).
238
§ 442-h(3).
239
§ 442-h(2); see N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir.
1994).
240
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-h(3) (2002).
241
Id.
231
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In New York State Association of Realtors v. Shaffer (NYSAR), real
estate agents challenged the constitutionality of a non-solicitation order that
banned real estate solicitation in certain areas of four New York counties.242
In Anderson v. Treadwell, the plaintiffs, engaged in the real estate business,
challenged the validity of the New York regulation permitting cease and
desist zones on First Amendment grounds.243
In analyzing each case, the Second Circuit applied the Central Hudson
framework.244 First, in both cases, neither party disputed that the real estate
solicitations contained non-misleading commercial speech related to lawful
activity.245 In NYSAR, the court found that the real estate brokers’ solicitation
of homeowners constitutes lawful activity and that housing solicitations are
not per se misleading.246 Similarly, in Anderson, the solicitations contained
“truthful, non-deceptive information about themselves, the real estate
market, the nature of their services, and those of their company.”247 Second,
in each case, the court found the State’s interest to be substantial. In NYSAR,
the court ruled that the government had a substantial interest in thwarting
blockbusting.248 In Anderson, the court found that protecting the privacy of
residents from harassing solicitation served a substantial government
interest.249
The Second Circuit distinguished the two cases when applying the third
and fourth Central Hudson factors. In Anderson, the court found that a direct
relation existed between the restriction and the State’s interest.250 To
establish a direct connection, the court required the State to show that its
residents suffered real harm and that the restrictions would alleviate such
harm “to a material degree.”251 The court found the record sufficiently
demonstrated that the real estate solicitations caused real harm and that the
242
N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 835-37 (2d Cir. 1994). The real
estate agents brought their constitutional challenge under the First Amendment. Id. at 835.
243
Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 2002). In Anderson, the plaintiff
sent a flier to a home owner residing in a solicitation cease and desist zone, asking the home
owner to contact the plaintiffs if the homeowner wished to sell. Id. at 459. The Secretary of
State deemed the flier to be a solicitation and fined the plaintiffs. Id. Subsequently, the
plaintiffs challenged the validity of the New York law, arguing that the cease and desist zones
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 459–60.
244
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 460–61.
245
Id. at 461; N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 841.
246
N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 841.
247
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 460.
248
N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 841.
249
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461–62. The State proffered an additional substantial state
interest in protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting. Id. at 461. Finding the privacy
interest substantial, the court did not address whether the State had a substantial interest in
protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting. Id.
250
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461–62.
251
Id.
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cease and desist zones alleviated such harms by a material degree.252
Additionally, in Anderson, the Second Circuit found the restrictions to
be a reasonable fit.253 The court did not consider the cease and desist zones
to be over-inclusive since the zones and the registry matched the
homeowners who suffered the harm.254 The court weighed heavily the fact
that the zones were a “resident-activated restriction,” meaning the residents
helped identify the banned areas for solicitations.255 The areas identified as
cease and desist zones were the same areas where a large numbers of
homeowners complained about real estate solicitation. 256 Additionally, the
registry was limited to the homeowners that did not want to be subjected to
real estate solicitation.257 By this reasoning, the Second Circuit upheld the
state’s cease and desist zone restrictions banning real estate solicitation.258
Conversely, in NYSAR, the court found that some evidence of
blockbusting existed; however, the court struck down the non-solicitation
ban because the ban was not a reasonable fit compared to the degree of the
harm.259 The court reasoned that the restriction lacked a reasonable fit since
a less restrictive measure, such as cease and desist zones, may have just as
effectively combated the level of blockbusting present.260 The court focused
on the fact that, despite having cease and desist zones in place before the
non-solicitation ban, the Secretary failed to prove that a non-solicitation
order, rather than the resident-activated restrictions, would more effectively
combat blockbusting. Therefore, as applied to the real estate agents, the
court struck such restrictions down.261
The Second Circuit cases did not create precedent in New Jersey
because New Jersey is within the Third Circuit.262 The Second Circuit’s
reasoning, however, is helpful to understand how the Third Circuit would
apply the Central Hudson framework in determining the constitutionality of
252
Id. at 462. In reaching this opinion, the court found the popularity of the program, the
statements in support of the cease and desist zones at public hearings, and complaints of
violations to be sufficient to substantiate the harms. Id. at 462. Further, the same facts were
sufficient to establish the harms were alleviated by a material degree as a result of the cease
and desist zones. Id.
253
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 462–63.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 462.
256
Id. at 462–63.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 464.
259
N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1994).
260
Id. at 844.
261
Id.
262
See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 553 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e are not
bound by precedent from other circuits.”).
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restricting commercial speech related to real estate solicitation.263 Likewise,
the New Jersey Supreme Court uses the framework to make similar
determinations.264 Therefore, the Toms River cease and desist ordinance will
be considered under the Central Hudson framework.
Under the Central Hudson framework, a federal or state court is likely
to uphold the constitutionality of Toms River’s cease and desist ordinance as
constitutional under the First Amendment. As in Anderson and NYSAR, the
application of the first two prongs is relatively straightforward. To start, the
speech must be considered commercial speech.265 The speech Toms River
seeks to curtail is solicitations for the sale of residents’ homes. This clearly
constitutes speech advancing a commercial transaction, or speech for the
economic benefit of the speaker, because it is speech proposing a real estate
transaction. Real estate agents are using the speech for their economic
benefit as agents attempt to solicit the purchase of homes for resale to their
Orthodox Jewish clients at a profit. Therefore, because the real estate agents’
speech is commercial, the ordinance must satisfy the Central Hudson
framework.
Next, the speech being regulated by Toms River neither misleads nor
relates to illegal activity because the speech is clear and straightforward, and
regulates more than just speech related to blockbusting. It is hard to imagine
either party perpetuating the argument that the speech in question is
misleading. As mentioned above, misleading speech is afforded no First
Amendment rights because it upends the informational aspect of consumer
advertising.266 Here, there is no advertising. The speech is explicitly clear—
real estate agents want to buy residents’ homes. Homeowners certainly
understand the speech and the transaction it proposes.
Toms River is likely to argue that the regulated speech relates to illegal
activity. Specifically, Toms River will most likely contend that solicitation
tactics used by real estate agents perpetuate blockbusting, which is an illegal
activity. Speech regarding illegal activity is not afforded First Amendment
protection;267 thus, if the speech is related to blockbusting, Toms River has
the unfettered right to regulate the speech. That some of the speech may
relate to illegal activity, however, does not stop the Central Hudson analysis
because not all speech governed by the ordinance relates to blockbusting.
The ordinance pertains to all real estate solicitation in two zones within Toms
River despite whether the solicitations constitute blockbusting or not.
263
264

See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014).
See, e.g., E & J Equities, LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment of Franklin, 146 A.3d 623 (N.J.

2016).
265
266
267

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
Id. at 563–64.
Id.
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Therefore, the ordinance is subject to further analysis under the Central
Hudson framework to determine whether the suppression of commercial
speech is justified.

To be constitutional under Central Hudson, Toms River’s cease and
desist ordinance must advance a substantial governmental interest.268
Similar to Anderson and NYSAR, Toms River is likely to proffer that
substantial interests exist in (1) protecting the privacy of its homeowners,
and (2) protecting its neighborhoods from being victimized by blockbusting.
First, the Supreme Court has consistently held that there is a protectable
privacy interest in the home.269 Thus, there is no doubt that Toms River’s
protection of its residents’ privacy in their homes is a substantial
governmental interest. Second, protecting neighborhoods from blockbusting
is likely a substantial government interest because it is protecting the
neighborhood from an illegal activity. But, Toms River is likely to fail to
constitutionally justify its ordinance on other grounds.270 Therefore, going
forward, Toms River’s substantial interest is likely to be protecting its
residents’ privacy of their homes.
Next, Toms River must prove the restriction on commercial speech is
“directly related” to the substantial interest the town holds in protecting the
privacy of its residents’ homes. Judging by the evidence, there is little doubt
that the cease and desist zones are directly related to the residents’ interest
in the privacy of their homes. Given the findings in the Toms River report
and public hearing comments,271 it is evident that the solicitations exposed
the homeowners’ privacy interests to real harm. Examples of intrusions of
the home include: “[d]rive bys” where real estate agents take pictures of
residents’ homes, frequent and repeated solicitations on weekends and
holidays, and asking neighborhood children how many bedrooms are in their

268

See id. at 564.
See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Strattom, 536 U.S. 150
(2002); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995); Frisby v. Schiltz, 487 U.S.
474, 484–85 (1998).
270
While protecting Toms River neighborhoods from blockbusting is likely a substantial
interest, the ordinance would be over-inclusive in achieving that goal because speech relating
to real estate solicitation, but not related to blockbusting, would also be restricted. Therefore,
there would be less intrusive means of restricting speech related to blockbusting without
restricting speech relating to real estate solicitation. For example, Toms River already enacted
an ordinance which outlaws blockbusting. See TOMS RIVER, N.J., CODE OF THE TWP. OF TOMS
RIVER § 391-51 (2016), http://ecode360.com/30316219. Therefore, the court would likely
find the new ordinance over-inclusive and unnecessary to further the substantial governmental
interest.
271
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 11–13.
269
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homes.272 These examples illustrate the clear invasion of privacy in the
home.

Since the ordinance is Toms River’s third iteration of non-solicitation
ordinances, this further shows the harms were bona fide.273 This illustrates
the escalating demand to stop these unwanted and harmful solicitations
because the original ordinances failed to deter such invasion of privacy since
real estate solicitations kept occurring even after the first and second
enactments of the non-solicitation ordinances. Additionally, the cease and
desist zones alleviate the harms caused by the solicitations because the most
frequent and intense solicitations occurred in the two zones where real estate
solicitations are now banned.274 Consequently, those willing to sell their
homes in the no-knock zones may put their homes on the market to alert real
estate agents of their interest or intent to sell their home, instead of real estate
agents having to knock on every door trying to discern such information.
Finally, the Central Hudson framework analyzes whether the Toms
River ordinance is broader than necessary to serve the homeowners’ privacy
interest in their homes. The cease and desist zones match the areas where
residents are experiencing the harm because the cease and desist zones
encompass the areas and neighborhoods where the most frequent and intense
real estate solicitations occurred.275 As in Anderson, residents helped create
the cease and desist zones by identifying the most problematic areas for real
estate solicitation through their complaints.276
While the Toms River ordinance resembles the resident-activated
restriction praised in Anderson, it is important to note that the Toms River
restriction is different than the Anderson restriction. Unlike the cease and
desist zones in Anderson, the cease and desist zone under the Toms River
ordinance creates a blanket ban for all real estate solicitation in the
designated area.277 Residents falling within the zone are covered by the
solicitation ban, without regard to whether they want to be covered by the
ban.278 This type of ban seems more like the non-solicitation order seen in
NYSAR than the resident-activated ban in Anderson, thus, possibly leaving
272

Id. at 13–14.
See §§ 391-36.1, 391-48–55.
274
TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
275
Id. at 14–15.
276
Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding resident complaints
helped identify the banned areas of solicitation).
277
§ 391-55.
278
§ 391-55(c)(3).
273
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the Toms River ordinance on unstable constitutional grounds.
Unlike NYSAR’s blanket ban on solicitation, however, residents can opt
out of the non-solicitation ban by filing an affirmative statement with the
Township Clerk, asserting their wishes to receive real estate solicitation.279
Toms River will likely argue that this essentially creates a reverse residentactivated restriction where the extent of the solicitation ban is defined by
those opting out of the cease and desist zone, rather than the Anderson
approach where residents had to opt into the cease and desist zone. Thus, in
effect, the Anderson ban and Toms River ban reach the same outcome, just
through opposite means.
If Toms River’s ordinance is found to be more like NYSAR than
Anderson, this does not necessarily mean that the ordinance will be found to
be unconstitutional. While the ban in NYSAR was struck down, the court did
not facially invalidate the law allowing solicitation bans, stating that, under
different circumstances, it is possible that such a ban would be
constitutional.280 In light of this, Toms River’s ordinance is distinguishable
from NYSAR because the town took a different approach before passing the
solicitation ban.
For instance, Toms River’s progression to deal with its real estate
solicitation problem differs from NYSAR. To start, the Toms River created
a no-knock registry, which prohibited door-to-door solicitation of enrolled
residents.281 The original ordinance did not specifically include real estate
solicitations, and, as a result, residents were subjected to real estate
solicitations.282 In response to residents’ complaints, the town passed a
general anti-solicitation ordinance, specifically implicating real estate
solicitations.283 Still, the problem of real estate solicitation remained
unabated as evidenced by residents’ complaints. The final step was passing
the ordinance that allowed for the creation of cease and desist zones, and the
ultimate creation of the current cease and desist zones to protect the most
aggrieved areas of the town.284 While NYSAR started with cease and desist
orders and escalated to a blanket solicitation ban, the Secretary of State failed
to provide evidence of the resident-activated restriction’s ineffectiveness.285
Unlike NYSAR, each of Toms River’s previous efforts to combat real estate
solicitations proved ineffective as evidenced by the continued complaints of
residents.
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

§ 391-55(c)(4).
N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 1994).
§ 391-36.1 (2016), http://ecode360.com/30316219.
See id. See also TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
§§ 391-48 to -52.
§ 391-55.
N.Y. State Ass’n of Realtors, 27 F.3d at 844.
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Furthermore, in NYSAR, the court took issue with the lack of
investigation to determine the validity of the residents’ complaints.286 On
the other hand, Toms River’s solicitation ban was created only after an
investigation by the Business Administrator and Town Attorney to verify the
validity of residents’ complaints.287 Therefore, it is unsubstantiated to claim
the ordinance is over-inclusive or broader than what is necessary to protect
the homeowners’ privacy interests.
After applying the Central Hudson framework, the Toms River cease
and desist zone ordinance restricting real estate solicitation passes
constitutional muster and should be upheld against a First Amendment
challenge.
VII. CONCLUSION
Toms River is dealing with a unique situation. Its neighbor, Lakewood,
is in the midst of a population boom created by the exponential growth of its
Orthodox Jewish community. With increasing real estate demands and
decreasing space in Lakewood, Toms River neighborhoods have become the
site of intense and frequent real estate solicitations as real estate brokers,
representing Orthodox Jewish clients, attempt to penetrate the housing
market in these neighborhoods. The result: tension between Toms River
residents and the Orthodox Jewish community. In an attempt to protect the
interests of its residents, Toms River outlawed real estate solicitation in two
neighborhoods bordering Lakewood. The real estate agents affected,
however, are mainly Orthodox Jews, or represent mainly Orthodox Jewish
clients, leading to allegations, whether implicit and explicit, of antiSemitism.
Yet, under New Jersey case law,288 Toms River is allowed to enact
ordinances to prevent blockbusting. While critics may argue that Toms
River admitted blockbusting is not prevalent throughout the town, the intense
and frequent real estate solicitations experienced by certain Toms River
residents is the exact behavior the federal289 and state290 laws outlaw and it
is essential for Toms River to halt the practice before it becomes prevalent
throughout the town.
Further, as a restriction on commercial speech, Toms River’s ordinance
seems to be constitutional as viewed through the Central Hudson framework.
Toms River acted within its power to create resident-activated cease and
desist zones because it is protecting a substantial state interest in the privacy
286
287
288
289
290

Id. at 843.
See TOMS RIVER REPORT, supra note 8, at 3–14.
See Summer v. Twp. of Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 765–66 (N.J. 1969).
42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2012).
N.J. STAT. ANN 10:5–12(k) (2017).
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of Toms River residents’ homes, directly alleviating the problem of real
estate solicitation, and the restriction is no broader than necessary.
Therefore, Toms River’s ordinance does not violate the First Amendment
rights of real estate brokers, and it is within the town’s authority to curtail
solicitations as commercial speech.
By enacting this ordinance, Toms River is not closing its doors on the
Orthodox Jewish community. If Toms River residents list their homes on
the market for sale, nothing prevents those in the Orthodox Jewish
community from purchasing houses within the cease and desist zones.
Unquestionably, though, Toms River is slamming the door on real estate
brokers’ use of aggressive and intimidating tactics.

